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WAIVING THE DUTY TO MITIGATE IN COMMERCIAL 
LEASES 
ABSTRACT 
This Note examines a largely unexplored consequence of jurisdictions 
adopting a default duty to mitigate for commercial leases: whether a con-
tract provision waiving the duty should be enforced. Only a few courts 
across the country have addressed the waiver issue in a commercial set-
ting. At least two different appeals courts have enforced a waiver clause 
and claim that public policy supports their decision. In contrast, a federal 
court has stated the opposite—that public policy demands waiver provi-
sions be void. Another state has outright voided all waiver clauses by 
statute. Courts that have enforced waivers have asserted that commercial 
parties have equal bargaining power and that these parties are free to 
enter into whatever agreements they wish. This Note argues that courts 
should not enforce clauses purporting to waive the duty to mitigate, be-
cause waivers are against public policy and there is no guaranteed equal 
bargaining power between commercial landlords and tenants. Finally, this 
Note proposes that states should adopt a blanket rule outright voiding all 
waiver clauses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The duty to mitigate is not a new legal principle. Rather, it is a well-
settled doctrine used in contract law to limit the damages an injured party 
may receive from a breach.1 Over the past few decades, courts have adopted 
the doctrine in lease disputes, requiring a landlord to make reasonable efforts 
to decrease the amount of due rent an abandoning tenant must pay.2 Not all 
jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine, but most states have decided that it is 
a default rule for landlords in both residential and commercial leases.3 
Once a state has adopted a default duty to mitigate, it may be confront-
ed with the question of whether that duty can be contractually waived.4 A 
waiver may occur when two parties agree in the language of the lease that 
if the tenant abandons, the landlord does not have a duty to mitigate the 
damages arising from the breach of the lease, even if the jurisdiction has 
ruled there to be a default duty.5 In academia, this aspect of the duty to 
mitigate has received only minimal attention.6 Until recently courts were 
not confronted with disputes over waiver in a commercial setting, and 
                                                                                                                         
1 See New Towne L.P. v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 680 N.E.2d 644, 646 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981). 
2 See, e.g., Schneiker v. Gordon, 732 P.2d 603, 611 (Colo. 1987); Austin Hill Country 
Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Tex. 1997); O’Brien v. Black, 
648 A.2d 1374, 1376 (Vt. 1994).  
3 See Austin Hill, 948 S.W.2d at 296. 
4 This is as opposed to “waiving” the defense of the duty to mitigate. The duty to mit-
igate can be an affirmative defense used by a tenant when a cause of action is brought 
against him. Courts will often rule a tenant “waived” the defense of the duty to mitigate 
by not pleading it. See, e.g., Stein v. Spainhour, 521 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
This Note discusses only a contractual provision to waive the landlord’s duty to mitigate 
damages when a tenant abandons a lease and not the “waiving” of the affirmative defense 
during litigation. 
5 See Woodland Investor Member, L.L.C. v. Soldier Creek, L.L.C., No. 11-2013-
JTM, 2013 WL 1893512, at *13 (D. Kan. May 23, 2012). 
6 See Dawn R. Barker, Note, Commercial Landlords’ Duty Upon Tenants’ Abandon-
ment—To Mitigate?, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 627, 648 (1995) (mentioning briefly that it is an 
issue “that the statutes do not address”); Jeremy K. Brown, A Landlord’s Duty to Mitigate 
in Arkansas: What It Was, What It Is, and What It Should Be, 55 ARK. L. REV. 123, 144 
(2002) (“Most jurisdictions have not addressed this issue, but the ones that have are split 
as to whether a waiver will be valid.”); Stephanie G. Flynn, Duty to Mitigate Damages 
upon a Tenant’s Abandonment, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 721, 766–67 (1999) (stat-
ing that “[c]ases and statutory law in many states do not address whether the duty to 
mitigate may be waived by the parties in the lease”). Despite largely discussing it in a 
residential lease, for a more in-depth discussion of waiver in the Illinois statute concern-
ing the duty to mitigate, see Anthony J. Aiello, Legislative Note, Illinois Landlords’ New 
Statutory Duty to Mitigate Damages: Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 110, § 9-213.1, 34 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1033, 1054–58 (1984–85). 
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even now only a few courts and legislatures have resolved this issue.7 A 
number of states have fundamentally rejected attempts by landlords to 
waive their duty to mitigate damages arising out of breach of residential 
leases.8 In a commercial lease, however, the issue is not as simple. This 
Note will focus on the law applying to commercial leases. 
States are split on whether parties to a commercial lease can contractu-
ally waive the duty to mitigate. In North Carolina and Ohio, appellate 
courts have ruled that despite the default rule requiring the duty to miti-
gate, waiver is allowed.9 At least one other state—Texas—has ruled that a 
waiver is unenforceable, but has only done so with legislative interven-
tion.10 Likewise, while attempting to predict New Jersey law, a federal 
court has ruled against enforcing waiver.11 
In Part I, this Note will review the evolution of the duty to mitigate in 
both residential and commercial leases. In Part II, the Note will consider 
how the states have justified adopting the duty as a default rule. Then, 
following a discussion of why states have chosen to enforce or void waiv-
ers in Part III, the Note will recommend in Part IV that states follow the 
lead of Texas and forbid contractual waiver in commercial leases. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY OF THE DUTY TO MITIGATE 
A. The Duty to Mitigate 
Parties to a property lease agree that a tenant will occupy a property 
owned by the landlord for a certain amount of time.12 One of the many 
ways that a breach may arise occurs when the tenant abandons the premis-
es before the end of the lease and refuses to pay the remainder of rent due 
                                                                                                                         
7 See Brown, supra note 6, at 144.  
8 When approaching residential leases in states, these rejections have been by statute. 
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.633(1)(k) (West 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 70-24-404(1)(b) (West 2013); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006 (West 2013). The 
Uniform Residential–Landlord Tenant Act, on which many states base their statutes, 
“apparently” forbids waiver clauses. Aiello, supra note 6, at 1056–57. 
9 See infra Part III.B. 
10 See infra Part III.A.1. 
11 New Jersey’s highest court has not ruled on waiver. A lower state court held that 
the duty may be contracted away, but the Southern District of New York, in attempting to 
predict New Jersey law, held waivers unenforceable. Though not binding on a state court, 
this case is used as an example of a court supporting the unenforceability of waiver 
clauses. See discussion infra Part  III.A.2. 
12 E.g., Franklin v. Jackson, 847 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). 
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under the agreement.13 At common law, a landlord facing a breach has 
three options: (i) he may accept the surrender of the premises and agree to 
a premature termination of the contract; (ii) he may reenter, attempt to re-
let the premises, and hold the original tenant liable for accrued rent be-
tween the time of reentry and the abandonment; or (iii) he may do nothing 
and hold the tenant liable for the entire term.14 
The law has evolved to generally disfavor landlord inaction; doctrine 
says that he cannot be allowed to sit idle and attempt to collect damages as 
rent becomes due or at the end of the contract when all damages have 
accumulated.15 Economic rationale supports a regime that disallows land-
lords to rest apathetically.16 As a result, jurisdictions implement a default 
duty to forbid landlord inaction.17 
The duty to mitigate in a lease prevents a landlord from recovering 
avoidable damages,18 typically unpaid rent.19 The reality of the duty to 
                                                                                                                         
13 See, e.g., New Towne L.P. v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 680 N.E.2d 644, 645 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
14 See, e.g., Wilson v. Ruhl, 356 A.2d 544, 546 (Md. 1976), overruled on other 
grounds by Millison v. Clarke, 413 A.2d 198 (Md. 1980). When the landlord re-lets the 
property, the original tenant is also liable for any deficiency between the original rent and 
the new rental amount. Id. 
15 See, e.g., id. 
16 For discussion, see infra Part  II. Contrast Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 773 
(N.J. 1977) (stating with respect to residential leases that “claims must be governed by 
more modern notions of fairness and equity.”). 
17 “The landlord is not required to simply fill the premises with any willing tenant; the 
replacement tenant must be suitable under the circumstances.” Austin Hill Country Real-
ty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Tex. 1997). Courts usually state 
the standard as using reasonable efforts. See, e.g., id. (asserting that the “duty to mitigate 
requires the landlord to use objectively reasonable efforts to fill the premises”); French-
town Square P’ship v. Lemstone, Inc. 791 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ohio 2003) (declaring it 
“requires only reasonable efforts”). 
18 See Flynn, supra note 6, at 723–24. 
19 See, e.g., Kotis Props., Inc. v. Casey’s, Inc. 645 S.E.2d 138, 139 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2007) (stating that landlord filed suit “for breach of the Lease. [Landlord] sought the 
accrued unpaid rent....”); New Towne L.P. v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 680 N.E.2d 644, 
645 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the landlord filed an “action to recover rent on the 
breach of a commercial lease.”). A landlord may also sue for anticipatory breach of the 
lease in anticipation of the tenant not paying rent. See Austin Hill, 948 S.W.2d at 295. 
Anticipatory breach is a well-settled cause of action under contract law. See generally W. 
W. A., Annotation, Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach as Applicable to a Contract which 
the Complaining Party has Fully Performed, 105 A.L.R. 460 (2012). When applying the 
duty to mitigate to a lease, some courts consider collection of rent as separate from an 
action like anticipatory breach. See, e.g., M & V Barocas v. THC, Inc., 549 N.W.2d 86, 
87–88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (“A landlord’s action for rent has been recognized as a 
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mitigate can make the label misleading,20 for failure of the duty does not 
create an independent cause of action.21 It does not place an obligation 
on the landlord to re-let the premises, but only requires the landlord to 
make reasonable efforts to limit damages caused by the abandoning ten-
ant.22 If the landlord does not attempt to mitigate, unpaid rent that could 
have been collected from another tenant (had efforts been made to re-let) 
is unrecoverable.23 
The duty to mitigate is an original feature of contract law and has be-
come a default rule for commercial leases in most states today.24 That 
default rule has developed through legislation or judicial mandate within 
the past few decades.25 The trend is part of a larger historical push away 
from approaching leases through the lens of property law and toward in-
terpreting a lease using contract principles.26 As with many legal doc-
trines, the United States inherited the duty to mitigate from English law.27 
B. A History of Leases: Property, Contract, or Both? 
In early common law England, leases were originally interpreted by 
courts as contracts, but as the demands of tenants began to change, courts 
transformed the lease into a legal conveyance of land.28 As such, property 
law governed and the tenant gained some “abstract portion of the land” for 
the limited time of the lease.29 
The property interest was born from the historical agricultural relation-
ship between landlords and tenants.30 When a tenant needed land for 
                                                                                                                         
distinct cause of action that differs from other available remedies for breach of a lease 
contract.”). 
20 See Flynn, supra note 6, at 723–24. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts calls 
the duty to mitigate “[a]voidability as a [l]imitation on [d]amages.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981). 
21 E.g., Austin Hill, 948 S.W.2d at 299; Flynn, supra note 6, at 723–24. 
22 Flynn, supra note 6, at 723–24. 
23 Id. at 724. 
24 See generally Barker, supra note 6. 
25 E.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-213.1 (West 2013); Austin Hill, 948 S.W.2d 
293, 295–96 (2003). 
26 See Glen Weissenberger, The Landlord’s Duty to Mitigate Damages on the Ten-
ant’s Abandonment: A Survey of Old Law and New Trends, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 3–7 (1980). 
27 See Edwin Smith, Jr., Extending the Contractual Duty to Mitigate Damages to 
Landlords when a Tenant Abandons the Lease, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 553, 555–57 (1990). 
28 See Flynn, supra note 6, at 724. The trends of the landlord-tenant relationship have 
usually changed as a result of granting greater rights for the tenant. Weissenberger, supra 
note 26, at 3–7; Smith, supra note 27, at 556–57. 
29 Frenchtown Square P’ship v. Lemstone, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 417, 419 (Ohio 2003). 
30 See Smith, supra note 27, at 555–57. 
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farming or other agrarian purposes, the property was not just a living 
space but a livelihood.31 The property approach was designed to benefit a 
tenant with causes of actions that go along with a possessory interest in the 
land.32 The practical result was that the tenant was left, for the most part, 
to do what he wanted with the leased land while the landlord no longer 
had any obligations.33 
The legal ramifications of viewing the lease as a land conveyance pro-
duced results that did not include the duty to mitigate.34 In a property 
framework, “a tenant who vacated was considered to have abandoned his 
estate, not the landlord’s, thus negating any duty on the part of the land-
lord to mitigate the loss.”35 Courts generally followed property doctrine 
and reasoned that because the landlord did not have an obligation to the 
property, he did not have a duty to mitigate.36 However, the law began to 
change once courts returned to contract law for interpreting leases.37 
Since the 1800s, the societal shift toward urban centers and industrial 
commerce changed the dynamic of the landlord-tenant relationship.38 
Land became less valuable for agricultural purposes and more important 
for the residential or commercial buildings that could be placed on top of 
it.39 As the motives for renting started to change, tenants began to demand 
different rights and leases began to be interpreted through contract law.40 
The reintroduction of contract principles as applied to leases came from a 
“growing realization that the conveyance fiction fails to comport with the 
realities of most modern tenancies....”41 As the lease came to be viewed 
more as a contract, courts interpreted it in accordance with contract law.42 
                                                                                                                         
31 See id. 
32 Flynn, supra note 6, at 725. See Schneiker v. Gordon, 732 P.2d 603, 606 (Colo. 
1987) (en banc). 
33 See Flynn, supra note 6, at 725. 
34 See infra Part  II. 
35 Rubin v. Dondysh, 549 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581 (Civ. Ct. 1989). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See Smith, supra note 27, at 557. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 Weissenberger, supra note 26, at 5. 
42 See Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 904 (Utah 1989) (“The trend 
rule reflects the more modern view that leases are essentially commercial transactions, 
contractual in nature.”). Along with the duty to mitigate, courts started enforcing the 
contractual issue of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In Brennan Associates v. 
OBGYN Specialty Group, P.C., the court clearly analogizes the commercial lease as a 
contract while discussing the application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
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The process of transformation has left leases to be seen as hybrid doc-
uments; property is involved, but contract principles are often applied.43 
As one court noted: 
[T]he present law of leases is a blend of property concepts and of con-
tractual doctrines, made for the service of a wide variety of objectives; 
agrarian, urban and financial. This historical background makes it clear 
that we can expect varying proportions of these basic ingredients in the 
decision of cases litigated now and in the future. Any fixity of propor-
tions would destroy the elasticity of the law, which is, at once, its glory, 
its challenge and its factor of uncertainty.44 
The law has embraced the combination of legal doctrines. Neither body of 
law can be looked to exclusively when attempting to find a solution to a 
case involving a lease.45 
II. THE DUTY TO MITIGATE FOR COMMERCIAL LEASES  
AS ADOPTED BY THE STATES 
While jurisdictions disagreed on whether to apply contract law to leas-
es, those that did were confronted with the question of forcing the duty to 
mitigate upon landlords. At first, courts followed the common law and 
interpreted leases as a land conveyance, ruling a landlord had no duty to 
mitigate.46 For a time, this remained the majority rule.47 The no-mitigation 
rule was supported by opinions finding that the landlord-tenant relation-
ship was personal and a landlord should not be compelled to take a new 
tenant.48 Courts stated that an abandoning tenant should not benefit from 
                                                                                                                         
dealing. The court does not address why it is interpreting the lease as a contract, it simply 
performs the analysis. See 15 A.3d 1094, 1103 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). 
43 See, e.g., Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 
299 (Tex. 1997); O’Brien v. Black, 648 A.2d 1374, 1376 (Vt. 1994); Flynn, supra note 6, 
at 725. 
44 Schneiker v. Gordon, 732 P.2d 603, 607 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (quoting 2 R. 
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY ¶ 221[1], at 187 (1986)). 
45 See id. at 606. 
46 E.g., Holy Props. Ltd., L.P. v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 661 N.E.2d 694, 696 
(N.Y. 1995) (“Leases are not subject to this general rule [of the duty to mitigate], howev-
er, for, unlike executory contracts, leases have been historically recognized as a present 
transfer of an estate in real property.” (citations omitted)). 
47 E.g., Dulworth v. Hyman, 246 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952) (stating that as 
of that date a landlord is not bound to mitigate damages in “a majority of the jurisdictions”). 
48 See, e.g., Weissenberger, supra note 26, at 6; see also N. Haven Crossing L.P. v. C 
& C Inc., No. CVNH 97078350, 1997 WL 630012, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 
1997) (“The reasons offered for this rule are that the landlord has expressed a personal 
choice in selecting the tenant, and is not required to accept a substitute ….” (quoting 
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his own breach,49 and that landlords should be able to reasonable rely on 
the established majority, no-mitigation rule.50 These rationales “largely 
depend[ed] on acceptance of the rationality of the common law fiction that 
a lease is a conveyance of property, not a contract.”51 Commentators criti-
cized these no-mitigation arguments and predicted a mitigation rule would 
eventually be widely adopted.52 
Court decisions have shown there are compelling arguments in favor 
of following the contractual approach to leases and adopting the duty to 
mitigate along with it.53 Most states have adopted common law or legis-
lative changes requiring mitigation or something similar.54 Courts slowly 
began to adopt the obligation in a commercial setting55 and have deter-
mined that commercial leases, in particular, 
                                                                                                                         
2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 17.05 (rev. ed. 1991) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))). 
49 Weissenberger, supra note 26, at 6. E.g., Reget v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 238 
N.E.2d 418, 419 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“The rationale is that the tenant cannot by his own 
wrong in abandoning the premises impose a duty upon the landlord.”). 
50 Weissenberger, supra note 26, at 6. E.g., Holy Props., 661 N.E.2d at 696 (“Parties 
who engage in transactions based on prevailing law must be able to rely on the stability 
of such precedents. In business transactions, particularly, the certainty of settled rules is 
often more important than whether the established rule is better than another or even 
whether it is the ‘correct’ rule.” (citations omitted)). 
51 Weissenberger, supra note 26, at 6–7. 
52 For an in-depth discussion of why these arguments fail, see Weissenberger, supra 
note 26, at 6–7. These arguments are beyond the scope of this Note. 
53 E.g., Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 296 
(Tex. 1997). 
54 According to Austin Hill, only six states follow a no-mitigation rule: Alabama (Ry-
als v. Laney, 338 So.2d 413, 415 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (residential); Crestline Ctr. v. 
Hinton, 567 So.2d 393, 396 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (commercial)), Georgia (Love v. 
McDevitt, 152 S.E.2d 705, 706 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (residential); Lamb v. Decatur Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 411 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (commercial)), Minnesota 
(Markoe v. Naiditch & Sons, 226 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Minn. 1975) (residential and com-
mercial)), Mississippi (Alsup v. Banks, 9 So. 895, 895 (Miss. 1891) (residential)), New 
York (Holy Properties, Ltd. v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 661 N.E.2d 694, 696 (N.Y. 
1995) (commercial)), and West Virginia (Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins & Co., 44 S.E. 149, 
151 (W. Va. 1903) (commercial)). Id. at 297 n.2. 
55 Many courts seem to have adopted the rule for residential leases before accepting it 
in a commercial setting. See, e.g., Frenchtown Square P’ship v. Lemstone, Inc., 791 
N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ohio 2003) (discussing whether the duty to mitigate extends to com-
mercial leases). New York has a peculiar situation in which its lower courts disagree on 
whether to extend the duty to mitigate. See Rubin v. Dondysh, 588 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 
(App. Term 1991) (“However, although there may be a duty placed upon residential 
landlords to attempt to rerent and thereby mitigate damages, no such requirement exists 
in the context of commercial leases.” (internal citations omitted)). But see 29 Holding 
Corp. v. Diaz, 775 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (“Although most persons appear to 
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reflect numerous and complex negotiations similar to other contracts. 
There are an increasing number of covenants included in commercial 
leases, emphasizing the idea that a modern commercial lease is essen-
tially an exchange of promises, and should be viewed under the princi-
ples governing the law of contracts. It is a general principle of contract 
law that one who suffers a breach must take reasonable steps to miti-
gate damages.56 
The complexity of commercial leases incentivized courts to treat them as 
commercial contracts and the duty to mitigate followed from the decision. 
Among other reasons, imposing the duty ensures economic efficien-
cy.57 It “promotes the most productive use of the land while at the same 
time, it discourages injured parties from suffering avoidable economic 
losses.”58 While promoting economic efficiency, the obligation does not 
benefit one party at the expense of the other; the landlord is “in as good 
[of] a position” as if the tenant had not abandoned the property while the 
tenant is relieved from paying the due rent.59 
Due to the varied options landlords are given when faced with an 
abandoning tenant, states have varying and nuanced approaches as to 
when a landlord has a duty to mitigate damages.60 As is expected with 
multiple jurisdictions and differing opinions, states also disagree about the 
ability to waive the duty to mitigate. 
                                                                                                                         
believe that a lessor has a duty to mitigate in a residential setting but not a commercial 
setting, this view is an uninformed and oversimplified construction of the law.”). The 
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (the second highest court in New York) 
quickly stated that a lease at issue “itself provided that the landlord was under no obliga-
tion to mitigate damages” but there is no further analysis of the waiver provision. Comar 
Babylon Co. v. Goldberg, 116 A.D.2d 551, 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). Because of this 
myriad of decisions, New York law is not used for this paper. 
56 New Towne L.P. v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 680 N.E.2d 644, 646 (Ohio Ct. App. 




60 Compare K & R Realty Assocs. v. Gagnon, 639 A.2d 524, 526 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1994) (holding that when a landlord refuses to accept a tenant’s surrender, there is no 
duty to mitigate, but “[w]hen the landlord elects to terminate the tenancy, however, the 
action is one for breach of contract ... and, when the tenancy is terminated, the landlord is 
obliged to mitigate his damages.”) with Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades 
Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 300 (Tex. 1997) (stating that “the landlord has a duty to 
mitigate only if (1) the landlord actually reenters, or (2) the lease allows the landlord to 
reenter the premises without accepting surrender, forfeiting the lease, or being construct-
ed as evicting the tenant”). 
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III. WAIVING THE DUTY TO MITIGATE IN COMMERCIAL LEASES 
As stated above, waiving the duty to mitigate in a commercial lease 
has not often been discussed in detail.61 When the issue is mentioned, the 
general conclusion is that most states simply have not addressed waiver.62 
However, a select number of states have recently ruled or enacted statutes 
addressing it.63 
A. Waiver is Forbidden 
1. Texas 
Texas is one of a few states that directly addresses contracting away 
the duty to mitigate. Under a statute titled “Landlord’s Duty to Mitigate 
Damages,” the law reads: “A provision of a lease that purports to waive a 
right or to exempt a landlord from a liability or duty under this section 
[i.e., the landlord’s duty to mitigate] is void.”64 A closer examination of 
the statute reveals a conflicted history. 
Common law in Texas allowed waiver. Austin Hill Country Realty v. 
Palisades Plaza, Inc. is the seminal Texas Supreme Court decision on 
the duty to mitigate in commercial leases.65 Palisades Plaza entered into 
a five-year commercial lease with Austin Hill.66 Palisades, as the land-
lord, owned and operated an office complex.67 Due to the action of the 
tenant-defendants, collectively “Austin Hill,” Palisades sued for anticipa-
tory breach68 of the lease.69 At trial, Austin Hill introduced evidence that 
                                                                                                                         
61 See supra text accompanying note 6. 
62 E.g., Flynn, supra note 6, at 766. 
63 In addition to the cases discussed here, Arkansas has also decided a case relating to 
waiver of the duty to mitigate. Weingarten/Arkansas, Inc. v. ABC Interstate Theatres, 
Inc., 811 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Ark. 1991); see also Sylva Shops L.P. v. Hibbard, 623 S.E.2d 
785, 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Weingarten/Arkansas as “holding that the parties to 
a lease agreement can provide that the landlord has no duty to mitigate damages upon the 
tenant’s default”). However, this case was decided mostly within the context of a surren-
der clause, so its wider applicability is limited and is not used for this Note. Additionally, 
the New York case Comar Babylon Co. v. Goldberg, cited by Sylva Shops as support, is 
also not used for this paper. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
64 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(b) (West 2013). 
65 948 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1997). 
66 Id. at 294. 
67 Id. 
68 For a discussion on how anticipatory breach as a cause of action may factor into an 
analysis of the duty to mitigate, see supra note 19. 
69 “Palisades received conflicting instructions about the completion of the suite [con-
tracted over in the lease] from” the two owners of Austin Hill, and the defendant’s failure 
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attempted to prove Palisades had failed to mitigate damages that resulted 
from the breach.70 
In its opinion, the Texas Supreme Court imposed the duty to mitigate 
on commercial leases, citing economic efficiency among its justifica-
tions.71 The court also framed its decision in the context of public policy, 
stating that “policy requires that the law discourage even persons against 
whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering economic 
loss which could be averted by reasonable efforts.”72 Incentivizing the 
landlord to re-let fosters productive use of property and benefits the pub-
lic.73 The court considered the increased possibility that unoccupied prop-
erty may be vandalized,74 its own aversion to imposing contract penal-
ties,75 and the growing trend to view leases as “business arrangements.”76 
The court did not discuss waiver in-depth, but in its conclusion it rec-
ognized the duty to mitigate “unless the commercial landlord and tenant 
contract otherwise.”77 No other mention of waiver was made. This state-
ment alone is directly opposed to the statute enacted by the Texas legisla-
ture, which expressly forbids waiver in any lease situation.78 The statute 
overrides Austin Hill’s dicta, but the court’s opinion is evidence of the 
divergent positions of the legislature and judiciary. 
In addition, the Texas statute was enacted at nearly the same time as the 
Austin Hill decision.79 Austin Hill was decided in July 1997, while the pub-
lic law for this statute was signed by the Texas Governor in June 1997.80 
                                                                                                                         
to designate a representative in which Palisades could keep in contact with was treated as 
an anticipatory breach. Austin Hill, 948 S.W.2d at 295. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 299 (stating that “the state of Texas calls for productive use of property as 
opposed to avoidable economic waste”). 
72 Id. at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. (“If the landlord is encouraged to let the property remain unoccupied, ‘the pos-
sibility of physical damage to the property through accident or vandalism is increased.’” 
(quoting Schneiker v. Gordon, 732 P.2d 603, 610 (Colo. 1987))). 
75 Id. (stating that “allowing a landlord to leave property idle ... permits the landlord to 
recover more damages than it may reasonably require to be compensated for the tenant’s 
breach. This is analogous to imposing a disfavored penalty upon the tenant.” (quoting 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 905–06 (Utah 1989)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 299 (emphasis added). 
78 See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(b) (West 2013). 
79 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1205. 
80 Id. 
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This timeline places the common law case decision after the statute,81 but 
Austin Hill was argued in September 1996, before the bill was first filed in 
the Texas Senate.82 Perhaps it can be argued the legislature voided waiver 
provisions in commercial leases for the reasons the duty to mitigate be-
came a default rule, as described in Austin Hill.83 
2. The Federal Decision in New Jersey 
New Jersey currently has unsettled state law about whether contractual 
clauses waiving the duty to mitigate should be enforced, but at least one 
federal court interpreting New Jersey law has addressed the issue.84 In 
Carisi v. Wax,85 a New Jersey lower court held that a waiver is enforcea-
ble, stating that the parties may contractually “obviate [the] tenant’s right 
to have the landlord mitigate damages.”86 A few years later, an appellate 
court decided to “leave that determination [of waiver] for a case in which 
the issue is squarely presented.”87 After that, Carisi was parenthetically 
referred to, but the highest court in New Jersey, the Supreme Court, did 
not indicate whether it agreed with the ruling.88 It cited Carisi to support 
that “on several occasions lower courts have extended the mitigation rule 
to commercial leases.”89 
The Southern District of New York, in Drutman Realty Co. v. Jindo 
Corp., received a case almost directly on point. The court needed to apply 
New Jersey law to decide whether a waiver provision was valid.90 The 
court discussed the unresolved status in New Jersey and mentioned that it 
must “look to the treatment of commercial leases under New Jersey law 
generally” to determine what its Supreme Court would do if confronted 
with the issue.91 Choosing to follow the state’s contractual foundations, 
the district court did not enforce the waiver.92 
                                                                                                                         
81 At least one author stated that Austin Hill “provoked” the Texas statute. Kent 
Altsuler, A Landlord’s Duty to Mitigate in Texas: What if You Build It, And They Don’t 
Come?, HOUS. LAW., July/Aug. 2011, at 27.  
82 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1205. 
83 See infra Part  IV for further discussion. 
84 The rest of this paragraph is adopted from Drutman Realty Co. v. Jindo Corp., 865 
F. Supp. 1093, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
85 471 A.2d 439 (N.J. Bergen Dist. Ct. 1983). 
86 Id. at 443. 
87 Fanarjian v. Moskowitz, 568 A.2d 94, 99–100 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). 
88 McGuire v. City of Jersey City, 593 A.2d 309, 314 (N.J. 1991). 
89 Id. 
90 Drutman Realty Co. v. Jindo Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1093, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
91 Id. at 1100–01. 
92 Id. at 1099. 
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The federal court did not cite any case in New Jersey that examined 
waiver as closely as did Carisi. Instead, the court cited a case discussing 
the duty to mitigate generally93 and stated that the New Jersey “court 
based its determination on the strong public policy in favor of ensuring 
that a landlord make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages.”94 The Drut-
man court followed the policy argument, stating that “[c]ourts will not 
enforce provisions ... that are contrary to public policy.”95 Further examin-
ing New Jersey contract principles, the Drutman court concluded that 
there was “an absolute duty to mitigate damages” and that a clause reliev-
ing the landlord of that duty was unenforceable.96 
Of course, the Drutman case is not binding on any New Jersey state 
court, nor can it be said to be the law in New Jersey.97 However, the case 
may be indicative of a court’s rationale when not enforcing a waiver 
clause in a commercial lease. It was public policy to promote the absolute 
duty to mitigate damages, and contract law forbids a clause waiving it.98 
The court relied on the same component of contract law as Austin Hill—
public policy.99 However, while analyzing public policy the federal court 
decided not to enforce the waiver. The courts in North Carolina and Ohio 
discussed public policy further but landed opposite of Drutman. 
B. Waiver is Allowed 
1. North Carolina 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently ruled on waiver in Sylva 
Shops L.P. v. Hibbard.100 Taking the opposite stance of the Texas legislature, 
the North Carolina court thoughtfully spelled out why it believed waiver of 
the duty to mitigate is not against public policy and is enforceable.101 
                                                                                                                         
93 Carter v. Sandberg, 458 A.2d 924 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1983). 
94 Drutman, 865 F. Supp. at 1100 (quoting Carter v. Sandberg, 458 A.2d 924, 926 
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
95 Id. at 1101. 
96 Id. During this analysis, the court alluded to the economic waste theory as a support 
for its argument.  
97 See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
98 Drutman, 865 F. Supp. at 1101. 
99 The examination of public policy was for the duty to mitigate generally and not for 
waiver. See Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 
298 (Tex. 1997). 
100 623 S.E.2d 785 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
101 Id. at 790–92. 
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The case arose when the loss of business from college students during 
the summer forced a tenant—a family-owned bagel shop—to close.102 The 
landlord attempted to find a new tenant, but the original tenant claimed 
that the landlord’s refusal to lower rent price led to difficulties in finding a 
replacement occupant.103 The lease between the landlord and the original 
tenants contained a provision relieving the landlord of any obligation to 
mitigate,104 and the landlord relied on this clause in arguing it owed no 
duty to the original tenants.105 
The North Carolina court recognized that state law imposed a general 
duty to mitigate, but there was still a dispute because “[t]he existence of a 
common law duty of care does not, however, absolutely preclude parties 
from agreeing in a contract to relieve a party of that duty.”106 To hold a 
contract clause unenforceable in North Carolina, it must either violate a 
statute or be against public policy.107 No statute was violated, so the court 
examined the provision under public policy.108 
While alluding to contract law, the court stated that it was “the broad 
policy of the law which accords to contracting parties freedom to bind 
themselves as they see fit....”109 Parties to a contract have the freedom to 
“exercise poor judgment” and the law will not protect them from a legal 
agreement that is unwise in hindsight.110 Though not specifically refer-
enced in the opinion, this rationale can be known as the freedom to con-
tract.111 The court also analogized that clauses relieving parties from neg-
ligence liability are enforceable.112 
The court quickly dismissed an argument about possible unequal bar-
gaining power between the parties, stating that “[t]he lease represents an 
arm’s length commercial transaction with both parties using brokers or 
                                                                                                                         
102 Id. at 788. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 789 (quoting the lease provision which stated, “[l]andlord shall have no obli-
gations to mitigate Tenant’s damages by reletting the Demised Premises.”). 
105 Id. at 788. 
106 Id. at 790. 
107 Id. at 789 (quoting Hlasnick v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 539 S.E.2d 274, 276 (N.C. 
2000)). 
108 Id. at 790–92. 
109 Id. (quoting Hall v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 89 S.E.2d 396, 397–98 (N.C. 1955)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
110 Sylva Shops, 623 S.E.2d at 789 (quoting Troitino v. Goodman, 35 S.E.2d 277, 283 
(N.C. 1945)). 
111 See generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 641 (2009). 
112 Id. 
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advisors to assist them in obtaining the best possible bargain.”113 It 
claimed that commercial leases “generally involve relatively equal bar-
gaining power due to the availability of other space and the fact that nei-
ther party is compelled to make a deal.”114 The contract created no “risk of 
injury to the public or the rights of third parties,”115 and in support of its 
arguments, the court cited cases from jurisdictions that ruled such clauses 
had not violated public policy.116 In a subsequent case the next year, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed its decision in Sylva Shops.117 
2. Ohio 
An Ohio appellate court ruled similarly to North Carolina when con-
fronted with a waiver of the duty to mitigate. The court in New Towne L.P. 
v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc.118 started from the same analytical position 
as the Texas and North Carolina courts, namely, that there was a default 
duty to mitigate in commercial leases, but the Ohio court decided similar 
to North Carolina and ruled that a waiver clause was enforceable.119 
Pier 1 Imports, as tenant, entered into a ten-year contract with New 
Towne.120 After nearly five years, Pier 1 defaulted on the rent and notified 
New Towne of its intent to abandon the premises.121 Within the original 
lease, there was a provision waiving any duty New Towne may have to 
mitigate damages.122 New Towne decided against reclaiming the property 
or terminating the lease and instead sued for the monthly rent as it became 
                                                                                                                         
113 623 S.E.2d at 790 (stating also that the defendants “admitted that ‘[n]obody was 
holding a gun to [their] head’ to sign the lease”). 
114 Id. at 791. While concluding its discussion, the court stated that “[u]nder these cir-
cumstances, the public policy of this State cannot relieve a party of the consequences of a 
commercial agreement that, in hindsight, proved not to be advantageous.” Id. at 792. 
115 Id. at 790. 
116 Id. at 791. These cases include Austin Hill and New Towne, both discussed in this 
Part. For discussion about the Arkansas and New York cases cited, see supra note 63. 
117 See Kotis Props., Inc. v. Casey’s, Inc., 645 S.E.2d 138, 140 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) 
(examining the exact language of the contract to determine whether there truly was a 
waiver). 
118 680 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
119 Id. at 646–47. 
120 Id. at 645. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. (“If LANDLORD does not elect to terminate this Lease on account of any de-
fault by TENANT, LANDLORD may, from time to time, without terminating this Lease, 
recover all rent as it becomes due under this Lease.”) (quoting the Lease Agreement). 
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due.123 The trial court ruled for summary judgment in favor of New 
Towne and Pier 1 appealed.124 
The Court of Appeals focused on the duty to mitigate more than the 
waiver issue.125 When it shifted to waiver, the court examined the lease at 
issue minimally, stating that “[p]arties of equal bargaining power are free 
to enter into any agreement.”126 It stated that only a violation of law or 
public policy could render an otherwise valid contract unenforceable.127 
Instead of diving in-depth into a discussion of public policy, as the Sylva 
Shops court did, the court simply stated the lease “does not injure the wel-
fare of the public in any way.”128 The court made no further inquiry into 
public policy129 and concluded that the waiver clause was enforceable.130 
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed New Towne through dicta, stating that 
“barring contrary contract provisions, a duty to mitigate damages applies 
to all leases.”131 
IV. ANALYSIS 
As demonstrated in the cases above, the enforceability of a provision 
waiving the duty to mitigate has largely revolved around the idea that the 
public welfare is not harmed by transactions in which the parties had 
equal bargaining power.132 This overall analysis stems from contract law, 
where contracts are enforceable unless they are illegal or are against 
                                                                                                                         
123 Id. 
124 Id. The trial court originally granted summary judgment based on reasoning that 
New Towne had no duty to mitigate damages. The court of appeals changed its reason-
ing, but affirmed the summary judgment ruling. Id. at 647. 
125 The court used some of the already mentioned arguments in favor of mitigation. 
Id. at 646; see supra discussion in Part  II. 
126 New Towne, 680 N.E.2d at 647. 
127 Id. (“A rental agreement may include any terms which are not inconsistent with or 
prohibited by law, or against public policy.” (internal citations omitted)). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. The court did cite an Ohio Supreme Court case discussing public policy—
Chickerneo v. Society National Bank. Id. (citing Chickerneo v. Soc’y Nat’l Bank, 390 
N.E.2d 1183 (Ohio 1979)). The Chickerneo court stated that “[p]ublic policy is a legal 
principle which declares that no one can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be 
injurious to the public welfare. The principle must be applied with caution and limited to 
those circumstances patently within the reasons upon which the doctrine rests.” 390 
N.E.2d at 1186. 
130 New Towne, 680 N.E.2d at 647. 
131 Frenchtown Square P’ship v. Lemstone, Inc. 791 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ohio 2003) 
(emphasis added). There was no further discussion of waiver. Note how this is similar to 
the dicta in Austin Hill for Texas, except in Ohio it has not been overruled by statute.  
132 See supra Part  III.B. 
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public policy.133 The rest of this Note will argue that (i) enforcing waiver 
of the duty to mitigate injures the public welfare; (ii) it should not be as-
sumed that parties to a commercial lease have equal bargaining power; 
and (iii) blanket rules voiding waiver clauses, as in Texas, should be is-
sued.134 Through examination of these three arguments, it is clear that 
rejecting waivers of the duty to mitigate provides the greatest safeguard 
against abuses for all commercial tenants. 
A. Injury to the Public Welfare 
There are many different ways to define public policy. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts provides guidelines,135 but many states have 
chosen their own interpretation. North Carolina, for example, defines 
public policy “as the principle of law which holds that no citizen can law-
fully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against 
the public good.”136 While analyzing public policy, the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals discussed how leases are private and “[n]o rights of third 
parties are involved.”137 Though no third parties may be present in private 
commercial leases, it is an assumption that the public goes unharmed by 
                                                                                                                         
133 E.g., New Towne, 680 N.E.2d at 647; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 178(1) (1981) (“A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest 
in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy 
against the enforcement of such terms.”). 
134 At least one author has proposed that courts “should undergo a case-by-case analy-
sis of the circumstances surrounding the [waiver] provision to ensure that it was freely 
negotiated and is fair and reasonable.” Brown, supra note 6, at 145–46. This approach 
seems costly and time consuming. For reasons discussed infra, a blanket rule would be 
more favorable. 
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2)–(3) (1981). These sections dis-
cuss what to consider when weighing the enforceability of a contract provision. For 
example, when a clause is considered for refusal due to public policy, a court should 
consider: 
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial 
decisions; 
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy; 
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it 
was deliberate; and 
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term. 
Id. 
136 Sylva Shops L.P. v. Hibbard, 623 S.E.2d 785, 790 (N.C. App. Ct. 2006) (quoting 
Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 n.2 (N.C. 1989)). 
137 Id. (quoting New River Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Austin Powder Co., 210 S.E.2d 285, 
287 (N.C. App. Ct. 1974)). 
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enforcing a waiver clause. States that chose to adopt the duty to mitigate 
did so largely for economic reasons, and those economic benefits are ex-
tended when parties cannot contract them away. 
When the law does not force landlords to mitigate an abandoning ten-
ant’s damages, usable property is more likely to lay idle for an extended 
amount of time.138 Sophisticated landlords may include a clause waiving 
mitigation simply because of self-interest,139 and when property is un-
derutilized there is economic waste resulting in a loss of economic effi-
ciency.140 Usable property should not remain idle for extended periods of 
time in order to benefit a landlord while the public is harmed. 
Enforcing a waiver provision violates the contract doctrine that renders 
the duty unwaivable.141 Although leases are still considered hybrid docu-
ments,142 courts could provide consistency by maintaining the contractual 
principles they have already adopted. The failure to extend contract law is 
a departure from the traditional analysis of the duty to mitigate that does 
not provide any concrete advantages.143 
When discussing public policy, the consequences of allowing waiver of 
the duty to mitigate should not be forgotten. A court could very likely push 
a tenant into bankruptcy by finding a waiver provision enforceable. It can be 
argued that many tenants initially breach a lease and fail to pay rent because 
they cannot afford it. Most abandoning commercial tenants are not corpora-
tions with deep pockets able to absorb judgments that make them liable for 
an entire lease.144 For every Pier 1 Imports there is an independent, small 
business-tenant similar to the bagel shop owners in Sylva Shops.  
                                                                                                                         
138 Id. 
139 Id. (stating that “allowing a landlord to leave property idle when it could be profit-
ably leased and forc[ing] the absent tenant to pay rent for that idled property permits the 
landlord to recover more damages than it may reasonably require to be compensated for 
the tenant’s breach” (quoting Reid v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 905–06 
(Utah 1989))). 
140 See Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 298 
(Tex. 1997). 
141 See John V. Orth, LEASES: Like Any Other Contract?, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 53, 65 
(2008) (adding that “contracts may include a provision for liquidated damages—so long, 
of course, as it is not simply a disguised penalty”). But contracted-for liquidated damages 
cannot be “unreasonably large.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) 
(1981). 
142 See discussion supra Part  I (addressing the lease as a hybrid document of contract 
and property law). 
143 Consistency was often an argument against adopting the duty to mitigate at all. 
Weissenberger, supra note 26, at 6. 
144 Sylva Shops L.P. v. Hibbard, 623 S.E.2d 785 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
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In the United States, there are 27.9 million small businesses, whereas 
only 18,500 companies have 500 or more employees.145 Most are sole-
proprietorships, making up 73.2 percent of all small businesses.146 For 
small businesses that employ others in addition to the owner, 27 percent 
are partnerships or sole-proprietorships and another 44 percent are S cor-
porations that can be taxed at personal rates.147 When these businesses are 
unable to pay rent their owners may be personally liable for the judgments 
against them. If the abandoning commercial tenant is just a small mom-
and-pop store, a judgment of only a couple thousand dollars can be disas-
trous, as it likely was for the tenants in Sylva Shops, where the court refer-
enced a separate case in which the bagel shop filed for bankruptcy.148 
According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, small “[b]usiness 
bankruptcies numbered 48,000 in 2011 ... [and remember that] not all firm 
deaths are business bankruptcies, and many business owners file personal 
bankruptcy instead of business bankruptcy.”149 When businesses and own-
ers are filing for bankruptcy, the economy suffers and the public is in-
jured.150 The societal costs of bankruptcy are large, with “[a]t least some 
of the costs of the consumer bankruptcy system ... are borne by all bor-
rowers as a group; other costs are borne by lenders, and still other costs 
are social deadweight loss.”151 Landlords do not appear to face the same 
threat of bankruptcy when courts enforce the duty to mitigate—it is likely 
the landlord will be able to find another tenant. Even if the landlord rea-
sonably searches for but does not find a new tenant, he will still get dam-
ages and legally be made whole.152 Forcing the duty to mitigate is the 
easiest, most straightforward way to avoid placing unnecessary economic 
burdens on the public. 
                                                                                                                         
145 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY 1 
(Sept. 2012), http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_2012.pdf.  
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 4. 
148 Sylva Shops, 623 S.E.2d at 788 n.1.  
149 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, supra note 145, at 3. 
150 See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 
99 NW. U. L. REV. 1496, 1499 (2005) (stating that “the option of bankruptcy creates a 
moral hazard problem and increases the risk associated with consumer lending, leading 
creditors to charge higher interest rates, demand collateral or a larger down payment, 
increase monitoring to prevent default, or increase penalties for risky behavior such as 
late payments.”). 
151 Id. (emphasis added). 
152 Even if the landlord is a small business owner himself, the reasonable costs of at-
tempting to mitigate damages are typically paid for by the breaching party. E.g., Sommer 
v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 773 (N.J. 1977). Thus, the landlord does not incur any additional 
losses to his business. 
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B. The Possibility of Unequal Bargaining Power 
Besides the economic risks, allowing waiver of the duty to mitigate 
puts many potential tenants at risk of manipulation. Unlike residential 
leases—where the parties are automatically deemed to have unequal bar-
gaining power153—courts that allow waiver seem to assume that both 
parties to a commercial transaction are on a level playing field.154 While 
this could be true for cases involving corporate giants (such as Pier 1 Im-
ports in New Towne), the truth is that many commercial tenants are small 
businesses or those not sophisticated in legal matters. 
Most businesses in the United States are not large corporations.155 Of 
the 27.9 million small businesses in the United States, 48 percent are not 
home-based.156 These statistics lead to the conclusion that for nearly half 
of small businesses, a commercial location outside of the owner’s home is 
viewed as a necessity by the small business owners. Likely more than a 
nominal amount of commercial tenants are small business owners without 
the resources necessary to equalize bargaining power with a counter-party 
who engages in lease transactions more frequently. 
In Sylva Shops, the tenants were bagel store owners that had to close 
down their shop because college students went away for the summer.157 
It is possible these individuals had as little bargaining power in signing a 
commercial lease as they may have had signing a residential lease. While 
tenants are not forced into an agreement,158 the risk of naivety and possi-
ble exploitation of small business owners is substantial. Unknowledgea-
ble potential tenants are unaware of the legalities inherent in leases and 
                                                                                                                         
153 See, e.g., Taylor v. Leedy & Co., 412 So. 2d 763, 766 (Ala. 1982) (“Clearly, land-
lords have greater bargaining power than tenants in residential leases. A tenant must live 
somewhere. The tenant has no meaningful choices. He can accept this landlord or go to 
another landlord who charges the same rent and asks the tenant to sign the same standard 
form lease. In other words, the modern standard form lease is in essence an adhesion 
contract. A survey of residential leases in Alabama would show that almost all leases 
contain these exculpatory clauses.”). 
154 See, e.g., Sylva Shops L.P. v. Hibbard, 623 S.E.2d 785, 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“In examining commercial real estate lease transactions in light of public policy consid-
erations, we recognize that negotiations generally involve relatively equal bargaining 
power....”). 
155 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, supra note 145, at 1. 
156 Id. 
157 Sylva Shops, 623 S.E.2d at 788. 
158 See, e.g., id. at 790 (stating the tenants “admitted that ‘[n]obody was holding a gun 
to [our] head.’”). 
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many cannot afford a lawyer, if they even believe they need one.159 Hir-
ing real estate brokers may be argued to equalize the bargaining power, 
but there is no guarantee that a short waiver provision in a lease will be 
flagged as threatening. Furthermore, one would be holding a real estate 
broker to have the legal sophistication of a lawyer. Also, unlike the court 
in Sylva Shops urges, many of these small business owners cannot just 
“look for another location,”160 either because they may be unable to af-
ford another location or the location chosen is the one necessary for the 
business.161 Overall, the presumption that all parties to every commercial 
lease have equal bargaining is not always true and courts should err in 
favor of protecting tenants. 
When courts analyze public policy, they are attempting to balance the 
possible benefits of enforcing the transaction against the harm to the pub-
lic welfare. All businesses are injured when there is empty space due to a 
landlord’s inaction. Furthermore, millions of small business owners may 
endure harm by unwittingly contracting to a waiver clause. While small 
businesses need to be protected, the general benefits a large corporation 
could receive from a court voiding waiver clauses need to be addressed.162 
A blanket rule approach to forbidding waivers of the duty to mitigate does 
not address the advantages larger companies may receive, but it is the best 
method to easily follow public policy. 
C. Adoption of a Blanket Rule 
In order to avoid the economic consequences of allowing waiver of the 
duty to mitigate, courts should adopt a blanket rule similar to Texas’s 
                                                                                                                         
159 Typically the reasoning for residential leases. See Ian Davis, Better Late Than 
Never: Texas Landlords Owe A Duty to Mitigate Damages When A Tenant Abandons 
Leased Property: Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 40 Tex. Sup. 
Ct. J. 228 (Jan. 10, 1997), 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1281, 1303 (1997) (quoting Respond-
ent’s Motion for Rehearing at 7, Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 
40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 228 (Jan. 10, 1997) (No. 03-94-00485-CV) (“A promitigation rule 
perhaps makes sense in the area of residential tenancies where the tenants are most often 
not familiar by education or experience with the intricacies of a lease and the effects of 
their decisions, and in which they rarely have the same bargaining power as the land-
lord.”)). 
160 Sylva Shops, 623 S.E.2d at 791. 
161 Typically, “[c]hoosing a business location is perhaps the most important decision a 
small business owner or startup will make....” Tips for Choosing Your Business Location, 
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/tips-choosing-your-business-locat 
ion (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).  
162 This will be discussed more in depth infra Part  IV.C. 
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statute.163 Section 91.006(b) of the Texas Property Code states that “[a] 
provision of a lease that purports to waive a right or to exempt a landlord 
from a liability or duty under this section [i.e., the duty to mitigate] is 
void.”164 Such a bright line rule solves any issues that are consequences of 
other “as applied” tests. 
A blanket rule is easy to enforce and provides certainty to contracting 
parties.165 Not only do landlords benefit by knowing that they must always 
attempt to mitigate, but a court can easily adjudicate disputes brought before 
it, conserving judicial resources. There is no confusion as to the illegality of 
the clause. The court will not have to conduct any sort of analysis of the 
specifics of the parties at hand. The size and dynamics of a tenant’s business 
are different for every lease, along with the relative bargaining power of the 
two parties at issue. Bargaining power especially is dependent on numerous 
factors in any given case, some of which may be quantifiable (wealth or 
number of previous similar transactions) and others not (expertise or 
knowledge of the transaction). If a court were to attempt to analyze all fac-
tors in all waiver disputes, substantial expenses would be incurred.  
A potential problem with a blanket rule approach is that it confers an 
advantage to large corporations that would not exist under another 
scheme. It can be argued that large corporations benefit from an absolute 
rule voiding a wavier clause when the corporation should be held the 
agreement it had the sophistication to bargain away during lease negotia-
tions. Proponents of enforcing the waiver clause tend to justify their sup-
port with ideas similar to the freedom to contract.166 The freedom to con-
tract is the belief that courts should not interfere with agreements between 
private parties.167 Large corporate tenants, equipped with in-house legal 
departments168 or hired attorneys, likely know better than to contract away 
the duty to mitigate. Or, perhaps a large corporation will take the risk and 
                                                                                                                         
163 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006 (West 2013). 
164 Id. 
165 See, e.g., Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (N.Y. 1990) (“The single in-
disputable advantage of a blanket preclusion—as with every absolute rule—is that it is 
clear. No lawyer need ever risk disqualification or discipline because of uncertainty as to 
which [parties] are covered by the rule and which not.”). 
166 See, e.g., New Towne L.P. v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 680 N.E.2d 644, 647 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
167 See Sylva Shops L.P. v. Hibbard, 623 S.E.2d 785, 790 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
168 According to at least one survey company, businesses are increasing the size of 
their legal in-house departments. See Press Release, HBR Consulting, Law Departments 
Increase Internal Staff and Keep More Work In-House, According to 2011 HBR Law 
Department Survey (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.hbrconsulting.com/downloads/HLDS_201 
1_Press_%20Release_111007.pdf. 
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bargain away the duty for some other more desirable clause in the lease. 
Supporters of the freedom to contract believe that businesses should be 
able to make these strategic (or mistaken) decisions and should not look to 
the courts to relieve them of their obligations.169 But the benefits that a 
large corporate tenant might attain by a blanket rule do not outweigh the 
costs of allowing waiver of the duty to mitigate. The risks to small busi-
ness tenants who have unequal bargaining power are just too great. Pre-
venting the suffering of a larger170 class of businesses is worth the possible 
unfair benefits to another.171 
An effort to divide leases between “small business tenants” and “larger 
business tenants” would help alleviate the worries of allowing large corpo-
rations to profit unfairly from the rule. A possible distinction for a court 
could mirror the U.S. Small Business Administration’s definition of a 
small business: companies with less than 500 employees are considered 
small.172 But this division may be arbitrary; a tenant with 499 employees 
is still relatively large and its owners may have the expertise that other 
smaller businesses may not. Any attempt to categorically enforce waiver 
based on available resources and the number of personnel fails because 
these quantitative distinctions do not fully address the fundamental prob-
lem of unequal bargaining power between parties. 
Another attempt could be to decide on a case-by-case basis and weigh 
factors to determine a tenant’s ability to waive. Some considerations could 
be the number of employees in a tenant’s business and whether the tenant 
had legal representation. Parol evidence could be used to learn more about 
the negotiations between the parties at hand.173 This sort of review, how-
ever, would be costly to courts and unnecessarily extend discovery and 
litigation.174 In contrast, a blanket rule would prevent all inquiry into the 
evidence at hand and conserve judicial resources. 
                                                                                                                         
169 See, e.g., New Towne, 680 N.E.2d at 647. 
170 See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, supra note 145, at 1. 
171 A possible alternative, if a state was adamant for allowing parties to waive, but still 
had concerns, could be to require a clause in all leases that explicitly and conspicuously 
states that the tenant is waiving the landlord’s duty. A requirement would be similar to 
that required under U.C.C. § 2-316(2) for waiving the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2012). 
172 See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, supra note 145, at 1. 
173 For more about parol evidence inclusion in contracts see Ferdinand S. Tinio, An-
notation, The Parol Evidence Rule and Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Establish 
and Clarify Ambiguity in Written Contract, 40 A.L.R.3d 1384 (1971). 
174 As is true with nearly every case, a goal of the courts is to avoid costly litigation. See, 
e.g., Hansen v. Hansen, 770 A.2d 1278, 1285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“The ultimate 
goal must be to avoid piecemeal litigation and the possibility of inconsistent results.”).  
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Though sophisticated tenants may unfairly benefit from a bright line 
rule, this advantage does not outweigh the benefit of helping tenants at 
risk of being taken advantage of through a waiver clause. A blanket rule 
similar to Texas’s would prevent injustice to small business owners, while 
also saving the legal system money and time by not having to examine the 
bargaining powers of parties to every lease. 
CONCLUSION: CONTINUE TO PROTECT TENANTS 
Leases are important instruments used every day in America. Their 
prevalence is undeniable. Throughout the course of legal history, leases 
have gone through several transformations, eventually becoming the doc-
uments used today. In an effort to increase tenant rights, leases have be-
come a mixture of property and contract doctrine. For residential leases, 
courts have near unanimously determined that leases should reflect the 
fact that tenants can be manipulated through the unequal bargaining power 
possessed by landlords. It is now time to adopt the same mentality for their 
commercial counterparts. The waiver of the duty to mitigate should be 
universally unenforceable. 
With a diverse commercial landscape, a landlord and tenant can dif-
fer significantly in bargaining power. Parties to a commercial lease 
should not be assumed to be sophisticated in business and law and a 
court should not assume a tenant to have mastery simply because the 
lease is commercial in nature.  
The duty to mitigate was originally applied to leases in part to help pre-
vent unnecessary tenant misfortune. A tenant can waive the duty without 
any knowledge of the consequences of his action. The economic disad-
vantages of having no duty to mitigate are well known and largely accepted. 
The results of not enforcing the duty to mitigate are also readily apparent. 
Tenants are at a greater risk of bankruptcy if they do not receive the protec-
tion that most states have claimed they are allowed to obtain. When parties 
declare bankruptcy, society is burdened with the economic consequences. 
By universally forbidding any contractual waiver of the duty to mitigate, 
courts can protect vulnerable tenants while preventing costly litigation and 
serving the public welfare. The protection granted by the legal system 
should not be waivable by the same parties the law is seeking to protect. 
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